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No. 11-11021 & 11-11067 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
STATE OF FLORIDA, by and through 
Attorney General Pam Bondi, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v. 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al., 
Defendants-Appellants.  
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the  
Northern District of Florida, 3:10-cv-00091-RV-EMT 
BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE NATIONAL INDIAN HEALTH BOARD; 
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NORTON SOUND HEALTH CORPORATION; PALA BAND OF LUISENO 
MISSION INDIANS; SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA; SHOALWATER 
BAY INDIAN TRIBE; SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE; SUSANVILLE 
INDIAN RANCHERIA; UNITED SOUTH AND EASTERN TRIBES, INC.; 
AND YERINGTON PAIUTE TRIBE;  
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS AND FOR  
REVERSAL OF THE DECISION BELOW 
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CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND  
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
Pursuant to 11
th
 Cir. R. 26.1-1, undersigned counsel for Amici Curiae 
certifies that, to the best of his knowledge, the following is a list of additional 
persons or entities that have or may have an interest in the outcome of this case and 
were not contained in the Appellants’ opening brief.  The amici tribal corporations 
and tribal consortiums listed below (identified with an asterisk) have no parent 
corporations and, as they have no stock, no publicly held company owns 10 
percent or more of their stock.
1
   
Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians* 
All Indian Pueblo Council* 
Bristol Bay Area Health Corporation* 
Chickasaw Nation 
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation 
Consolidated Tribal Health Project, Inc.* 
Council of Athabascan Tribal Governments* 
Great Plains Tribal Chairman’s Association* 
Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas 
                                                 
1
 Member tribes of each these tribal organizations are listed on Attachment A 
hereto. 
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Kootenai Tribe of Idaho 
Lytton Rancheria of California 
Maniilaq Association* 
Metlakatla Indian Community 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians 
National Congress of American Indians* 
National Indian Health Board* 
Nez Perce Tribe 
Northern Valley Indian Health, Inc.* 
Northwest Portland Area Indian Health Board* 
Norton Sound Health Corporation* 
Pala Band of Luiseno Mission Indians 
Seminole Tribe of Florida 
Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe 
Suquamish Indian Tribe 
Susanville Indian Rancheria 
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United South and Eastern Tribes, Inc.* 
Yerington Paiute Tribe 
/s/________________________ 
Geoffrey D. Strommer 
Counsel for Amici Curiae 
April 7, 2011 
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ATTACHMENT A 
 
LIST OF MEMBER TRIBES OF AMICI TRIBAL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians (AK, WA, OR, ID, CA, MT, NV) 
Organized Village of Kasaan 
Central Council of the Tlingit & Haida Indian Tribes 
Hoopa Valley Tribe, California 
Karuk Tribe  
Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation of Montana 
Chippewa-Cree Indians of the Rocky Boy’s Reservation, Montana 
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 
Montana 
Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation, Nevada 
Summit Lake Paiute Tribe of the Duck Valley Reservation, Nevada 
Chinook Tribe 
Duwamish Tribe 
Burns Paiute Tribe of the Burns Paiute Indian Colony of Oregon 
Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, Washington  
Coeur D’Alene Tribe of the Coeur D’Alene Reservation, Idaho 
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Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, Washington 
Confederated Tribes of the Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians of 
Oregon  
Coquille Tribe of Oregon 
Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Indians of Oregon  
Cowlitz Indian Tribe, Washington  
Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon  
Hoh Indian Tribe of the Hoh Indian Reservation, Washington  
Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe of Washington  
Kalispel Indian Community of the Kalispel Reservation, Washington  
Klamath Tribes, Oregon  
Kootenai Tribe of Idaho 
Lower Elwha Tribal Community of the Lower Elwha Reservation, 
Washington  
Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation, Washington 
Makah Indian Tribe of the Makah Indian Reservation, Washington  
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe of the Muckleshoot Reservation, Washington  
Nez Perce Tribe, Idaho  
Nisqually Indian Tribe of the Nisqually Reservation, Washington  
Nooksack Indian Tribe of Washington  
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Northwestern Band of Shoshoni Nation of Utah (Washakie)  
Port Gamble Indian Community of the Port Gamble Reservation, 
Washington 
Puyallup Tribe of the Puyallup Reservation, Washington 
Quileute Tribe of the Quileute Reservation, Washington 
Quinault Tribe of the Quinault Reservation, Washington 
Samish Indian Tribe, Washington  
Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe of Washington  
Shoalwater Bay Tribe of the Shoalwater Bay Indian Reservation, 
Washington  
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation of Idaho  
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon (previously listed as the 
Confederated Tribes of the Siletz Reservation)  
Skokomish Indian Tribe of the Skokomish Reservation, Washington  
Snoqualmie Tribe, Washington  
Snohomish Tribe 
Spokane Tribe of the Spokane Reservation, Washington 
Squaxin Island Tribe of the Squaxin Island Reservation, Washington 
Steilacoom Tribe 
Stillaguamish Tribe of Washington 
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Suquamish Indian Tribe of the Port Madison Reservation, Washington  
Swinomish Indians of the Swinomish Reservation, Washington  
Tulalip Tribes of the Tulalip Reservation, Washington  
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation, Oregon  
Upper Skagit Indian Tribe of Washington  
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon  
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation, Washington 
 
All Indian Pueblo Council (NM, TX) 
Pueblo of Acoma, New Mexico 
Pueblo of Cochiti, New Mexico 
Pueblo of Isleta, New Mexico 
Pueblo of Jemez, New Mexico 
Kewa, New Mexico 
Pueblo of Laguna, New Mexico 
Pueblo of Nambe, New Mexico 
Ohkay Owingeh, New Mexico 
Pueblo of Picuris, New Mexico 
Pueblo of Pojoaque, New Mexico 
Pueblo of Sandia, New Mexico 
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Pueblo of Santa Ana, New Mexico 
Pueblo of Santa Clara, New Mexico 
Pueblo of San Felipe, New Mexico 
Pueblo of San Ildefonso, New Mexico 
Pueblo of Taos, New Mexico 
Pueblo of Tesuque, New Mexico 
Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo of Texas 
Pueblo of Zia, New Mexico 
Zuni Tribe of the Zuni Reservation, New Mexico 
 
Bristol Bay Area Health Corporation (AK) 
Portage Creek Village (aka Ohgsenakale) 
Ekwok Village 
New Stuyahok Village 
New Koliganek Village Council 
Dillingham (Curyung Tribal Council)  
Native Village of Aleknagik  
Village of Clarks Point 
Native Village of Ekuk  
Knugank Tribal Council 
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Chignik Bay Tribal Council 
Native Village of Chignik Lagoon 
Chignik Lake Village  
Native Village of Perryville  
Ivanof Bay Village 
Manokotak Village  
Twin Hills Village  
Traditional Village of Togiak 
Native Village of Goodnews Bay  
Platinum Traditional Village 
Ugashik Village  
Native Village of Pilot Point  
Egegik Village  
Naknek Native Village  
South Naknek Village  
Levelock Village  
King Salmon Tribe  
Native Village of Port Heiden  
Native Village of Kanatak 
Nondalton Village  
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Village of Iliamna  
Pedro Bay Village  
Kokhanok Village  
NewhalenVillage  
Igiugig Village 
 
Consolidated Tribal Health Project, Inc. (CA) 
Cahto Indian Tribe of the Laytonville Rancheria, California 
Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians of California 
Guidiville Rancheria of California 
Hopland Band of Pomo Indians of the Hopland Rancheria, California 
Pinoleville Pomo Nation, California 
Potter Valley Tribe, California 
Redwood Valley Rancheria of Pomo Indians of California 
Sherwood Valley Rancheria of Pomo Indians of California 
 
Council of Athabascan Tribal Governments (AK) 
Arctic Village (Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government) 
Beaver Village 
Birch Creek Tribe 
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Canyon Village 
Chalkyitsik Village 
Circle Native Community 
Native Village of Fort Yukon 
Rampart Village 
Native Village of Stevens 
Village of Venetie (Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government) 
 
Great Plains Tribal Chairman’s Association (ND, SD, NB) 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe of the Cheyenne River Reservation, 
South Dakota 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe of the Rosebud Indian Reservation, 
South Dakota 
Crow Creek Sioux Tribe of the Crow Creek Reservation, 
South Dakota 
Yankton Sioux Tribe of South Dakota 
Lower Brule Sioux Tribe of the Lower Brule Reservation, 
South Dakota 
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Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation, 
South Dakota 
Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation, 
South Dakota 
Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe of South Dakota 
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 
North Dakota 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe of North & South Dakota 
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians of North Dakota 
Spirit Lake Tribe, North Dakota 
Omaha Tribe of Nebraska 
Ponca Tribe of Nebraska 
Santee Sioux Nation, Nebraska 
Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska 
 
Maniilaq Association (AK) 
Native Village of Kotzebue 
Native Village of Ambler 
Native Village of Buckland 
Native Village of Kiana 
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Native Village of Kivalina 
Native Village of Kobuk 
Native Village of Noatak 
Noorvik Native Community 
Native Village of Point Hope 
Native Village of Selawik 
Native Village of Shungnak 
 
Northwest Portland Area Indian Health Board (WA, OR, ID, UT) 
Burns Paiute Tribe of the Burns Paiute Indian Colony of Oregon 
Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, Washington  
Coeur D’Alene Tribe of the Coeur D’Alene Reservation, Idaho 
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, Washington 
Confederated Tribes of the Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians of 
Oregon  
Coquille Tribe of Oregon 
Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Indians of Oregon  
Cowlitz Indian Tribe, Washington  
Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon  
Hoh Indian Tribe of the Hoh Indian Reservation, Washington  
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Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe of Washington  
Kalispel Indian Community of the Kalispel Reservation, Washington  
Klamath Tribes, Oregon  
Kootenai Tribe of Idaho 
Lower Elwha Tribal Community of the Lower Elwha Reservation, 
Washington  
Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation, Washington 
Makah Indian Tribe of the Makah Indian Reservation, Washington  
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe of the Muckleshoot Reservation, Washington  
Nez Perce Tribe, Idaho  
Nisqually Indian Tribe of the Nisqually Reservation, Washington  
Nooksack Indian Tribe of Washington  
Northwestern Band of Shoshoni Nation of Utah (Washakie)  
Port Gamble Indian Community of the Port Gamble Reservation, 
Washington 
Puyallup Tribe of the Puyallup Reservation, Washington 
Quileute Tribe of the Quileute Reservation, Washington 
Quinault Tribe of the Quinault Reservation, Washington 
Samish Indian Tribe, Washington  
Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe of Washington  
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Shoalwater Bay Tribe of the Shoalwater Bay Indian Reservation, 
Washington  
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation of Idaho  
Confederated Tribes of the Siletz Indians of Oregon  
Skokomish Indian Tribe of the Skokomish Reservation, Washington  
Snoqualmie Tribe, Washington  
Spokane Tribe of the Spokane Reservation, Washington 
Squaxin Island Tribe of the Squaxin Island Reservation, Washington 
Stillaguamish Tribe of Washington 
Suquamish Indian Tribe of the Port Madison Reservation, Washington  
Swinomish Indians of the Swinomish Reservation, Washington  
Tulalip Tribes of the Tulalip Reservation, Washington  
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation, Oregon  
Upper Skagit Indian Tribe of Washington  
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon  
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation, Washington 
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Norton Sound Health Corporation (AK) 
Native Village of Brevig Mission 
Native Village of Council 
Native Village of Diomede 
Native Village of Elim 
Native Village of Gambell 
Chinik Eskimo Community (Golovin) 
King Island Community 
Native Village of Koyuk 
Mary’s Igloo 
Nome Eskimo Community 
Native Village of St. Michael 
Native Village of Savoonga 
Native Village of Shaktoolik 
Native Village of Shishmaref 
Village of Solomon 
Stebbins Community Association 
Native Village of Teller 
Native Village of Unalakleet 
Native Village of Wales 
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Native Village of White Mountain 
 
United South and Eastern Tribes, Inc. (ME, NY, MA, MS, NC, NY, FL, SC, 
LA, AL, RI, CT, TX) 
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians of North Carolina 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, Mississippi 
Seminole Tribe of Florida 
Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana 
Seneca Nation of New York 
Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana 
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, New York 
Penobscot Tribe of Maine 
Passamaquoddy Tribe of Maine 
Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians of Maine 
Tunica-Biloxi Tribe of Louisiana 
Poarch Band of Creek Indians of Alabama 
Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe of Connecticut 
Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) of Massachusetts 
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Alabama-Coushatta Tribes of Texas 
Oneida Nation of New York 
Aroostook Band of Micmac Indians of Maine 
Catawba Indian Nation 
Jena Band of Choctaw Indians, Louisiana 
Mohegan Indian Tribe of Connecticut 
Cayuga Nation of New York  
Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe, Massachusetts 
Shinnecock Indian Tribe 
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 1 
 
STATEMENT OF AMICI CURIAE INTEREST
1
 
The close to 350 tribes across the nation who are amici or members of amici 
tribal organizations represented on this brief are directly affected by the district 
court’s decision to invalidate the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(―Act‖ or ―ACA‖) in its entirety, including several Indian-specific provisions that 
have a separate purpose and genesis from the individual mandate declared 
unconstitutional by the court.  These Indian-specific provisions are legally 
separable from the remainder of the Act, are related solely to the Federal 
responsibility to provide health care to Indian tribes and their members, and are of 
critical importance to the delivery of health care services to Indian tribes and their 
members throughout the country.  If this Court reaches the question of severability, 
the amici have a strong interest in ensuring that the analysis includes a thoughtful 
consideration of the severability rules as applied to these separate and separable 
Indian-specific provisions of the Act. 
Amici include federally-recognized tribes and tribal organizations from 
across the nation, many of which are located in the Plaintiff states.
2
 
                                                 
1
 Pursuant to FRAP 29(c)(5), amici curiae state that no counsel to any party to this 
dispute authored this brief in whole or in part and no person or entity, other than 
amici and their counsel, made a monetary contribution to the preparation or 
submission of this brief. 
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 2 
 
The National Indian Health Board (NIHB) represents tribal governments—
both those that operate their own health care delivery systems through contracting 
and compacting, and those receiving health care directly from the Indian Health 
Service.  Its Board of Directors is made up of tribal member representatives from 
twelve Area Health Boards which are organized to correspond to the twelve IHS 
service areas.  NIHB provides a variety of services to tribes, the Area Health 
Boards, tribal organizations, federal agencies, and private foundations, including 
advocacy, policy development, research and training on Indian health issues, and 
tracking legislation and regulations.   
The National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), founded in 1944, is the 
oldest, largest and most representative American Indian and Alaska Native 
organization serving the broad interests of tribal governments and communities.  
NCAI is comprised of more than 200 American Indian tribes and Alaska Native 
villages and other associated organizations.  NCAI's mission is to inform the public 
and all branches of the federal government about tribal self-government, treaty 
rights, and a broad range of federal policy issues affecting tribal governments. 
                                                                                                                                                             
2
 One or more of amici tribes or tribes who are members of amici tribal 
organizations are located within 23 of the 26 Plaintiff states.  No federally-
recognized tribes are located in Georgia, Ohio or Pennsylvania. 
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 3 
 
Amici Lytton Rancheria of California; Pala Band of Luiseno Mission Indians 
of the Pala Reservation, California; Seminole Tribe of Florida; Suquamish Indian 
Tribe of the Port Madison Reservation, Washington; Susanville Indian Rancheria, 
California; Yerington Paiute Tribe of the Yerington Colony and Campbell Ranch, 
Nevada; Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, Mississippi; Metlakatla Indian 
Community, Annette Island Reserve; Nez Perce Tribe, Idaho; Kickapoo 
Traditional Tribe of Texas; Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe; Confederated Tribes of 
the Colville Reservation; Chickasaw Nation; and Kootenai Tribe of Idaho are 
federally-recognized tribes. 
Amici Consolidated Tribal Health Project, Inc.; Northern Valley Indian 
Health, Inc.; United South and Eastern Tribes, Inc.; Bristol Bay Area Health 
Corporation; Council of Athabascan Tribal Governments; Northwest Portland Area 
Indian Health Board; Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians; Maniilaq 
Association; Great Plains Tribal Chairman’s Association; Norton Sound Health 
Corporation; and All Indian Pueblo Council are tribal organizations
3
 representing 
consortiums of federally-recognized tribes. 
Many of the amici tribes and tribal organizations have entered into 
agreements with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, acting through the 
                                                 
3
 A list of the member tribes of each of the tribal organizations listed in this 
paragraph is attached as Attachment A to the Certificate of Interested Persons and 
Corporate Disclosure Statement. 
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Indian Health Service (―IHS‖), pursuant to authority of the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act (―ISDEAA‖), 25 U.S.C. § 450 et 
seq., in which they provide health care services directly to Indian people in their 
geographic areas.
4
  For example, the Seminole Tribe of Florida (―Seminole Tribe‖) 
has a Compact and Funding Agreement that implements provisions of the Indian 
Health Care Improvement Act (―IHCIA‖), 25 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., including 
amendments to that law enacted as part of the ACA.  Pursuant to its Compact and 
Funding Agreement, the Seminole Tribe has the responsibility to provide a broad 
range of health care programs and services authorized by the IHCIA amendments.   
The Seminole Tribe serves tribal members and other eligible individuals 
within a specific geographic area in the state of Florida, operating several clinics 
and offering a variety of Indian health care programs.  In providing these services, 
the Seminole Tribe relies on the IHCIA provisions in the ACA that have been 
incorporated into the Seminole Tribe’s ISDEAA Compact and Funding 
Agreement. 
Individually or collectively, amici tribes and tribal organizations either 
operate health care facilities and provide health care services to member Indians 
                                                 
4
 The Self-Governance Compact and Funding Agreement are governed by Title V 
of the ISDEAA, 25 U.S.C. § 458aa et seq.  
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and other beneficiaries pursuant to agreements with the IHS or they advocate on 
health issues affecting Indian people.  
Amici tribes and tribal organizations have knowledge of Indian health care 
policy and the implementation of federal laws related to Indian health care.  Amici 
also have considerable experience with the history and operation of current health 
care laws, including the IHCIA and the legislative history of the reauthorization 
and amendment of the IHCIA enacted in Section 10221 of the ACA and other 
related Indian-specific provisions in the ACA.   
Amici submit this brief with the consent of all parties.  Amici believe the 
brief will help the Court understand the questions presented in a broader context 
framed by the unique history of the IHCIA and other Indian-specific provisions of 
the ACA.   
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
This brief of amici addresses the following issue: 
Assuming the district court was correct in finding a discrete provision of the 
ACA unconstitutional, did the court err by applying the severability rule 
improperly, resulting in an order invalidating the ACA in its entirety, including the 
Indian-specific provisions of the ACA? 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court held unconstitutional the ―individual mandate‖ provision 
of the ACA
5
 and declared the Act invalid in its entirety, including Section 10221, 
which reauthorized and amended the IHCIA, as well as other Indian-specific health 
care provisions incorporated in the ACA. 
This case raises an important question: Whether the court below correctly 
applied the Supreme Court’s severability rules when it invalidated the ACA in its 
entirety, including the Indian-specific provisions that are of critical importance to 
Indian tribes and tribal organizations throughout the country.  The Indian-specific 
provisions have a separate genesis from the individual mandate provision, involve 
legally independent rights and obligations related solely to Indian tribes, Indian 
people and Indian health providers and should remain valid if the individual 
mandate is severed from the Act. 
When a court finds a portion of a statute unconstitutional, the remainder is 
presumed valid.  If a remaining provision is independent and ―fully operative as a 
law,‖ the court must leave it intact unless it is evident that Congress would not 
have enacted it separately.  See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa 
Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999) (quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation 
                                                 
5
 See § 1501 of the ACA, codified in 26 U.S.C. § 5000A.  The so-called 
―individual mandate‖ provision is termed ―minimum essential coverage‖ in § 1501. 
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Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)).  ―[T]he normal rule is that partial, 
rather than facial, invalidation is the required course.‖  Free Enterprise Fund v. 
Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S.Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
Section 10221 and the other Indian-specific provisions in the Act fall well 
within the ―normal rule.‖  They support an independent, freestanding Indian health 
care system, and are ―fully operative‖ as separate laws.  There is no evidence that 
the district court recognized or considered the terms and separate genesis of the 
Indian-specific provisions.  Having failed to follow the ―required course‖ of 
analysis,
6
 the district court’s severability ruling is overbroad, and should be 
reversed, at a minimum with respect to Section 10221 and other Indian-specific 
provisions of the Act. 
ARGUMENT AND CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY 
The Indian Health Care Improvement Act is one of many distinct and 
specialized federal laws designed by Congress to address the unique needs of tribal 
communities.  These laws were enacted to carry out treaty and other land-cession 
                                                 
6
 There was an alternative course the district court could have followed.  For 
example, the district court in Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F.Supp.2d 768, 789 (E. D. 
Va. 2010), recognized that the ACA encompassed ―a wide variety of topics related 
and unrelated to health care.‖  In that case the court acted circumspectly and 
severed only the individual mandate and ―directly-dependent provisions‖ which 
specifically refer to the individual mandate, leaving the remainder of the ACA 
intact.  Id. at 790. 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 04/08/2011     Page: 31 of 57
 8 
 
obligations assumed by the United States.  They have evolved as programs 
designed to implement the federal trust responsibility to provide health care to 
Indians and enhance tribal self-determination and self-governance, while providing 
tools for tribes to increase the quality and quantity of governmental services, 
including health care services, to Indian people.  See generally Cohen’s Handbook 
of Federal Indian Law §§ 22.01[1] - 22.01[3] (―Obligation to Provide Services‖) 
(2005 ed.).
7
 
Since 1976, the IHCIA has functioned as a stand-alone statutory framework 
for the delivery of health care services to Indian people, independent of any type of 
an individual mandate to obtain health insurance.  The IHCIA is critically 
important legislation that helps address the chronic health disparities in Indian 
country.  For over ten years, amici tribes and tribal organizations worked to enact 
much needed improvements to the IHCIA through a legislative process that was 
                                                 
7
 Adopted initially in 1976, the IHCIA, 25 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., has been 
amended several times as described below.  Congress has enacted broad legislation 
to facilitate tribal control of programs, including the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq. (authorizing tribes to contract 
and control federal programs); Tribally Controlled Schools Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2501 
et seq. (education); Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination 
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq. (housing); Indian Employment, Training, and 
Related Services Demonstration Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq. (employment and 
work training); Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (adoption and 
child welfare).  The Supreme Court has long recognized the ―distinctive obligation 
of trust incumbent upon the government‖ in its dealings with tribes.  See Seminole 
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942). 
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separate and independent from the ACA.  These amendments were added at the 
last minute to the bill that became the ACA because it was highly likely to be 
enacted.   
The IHCIA amendments legislation, S. 1790, was a separate bill with a 
separate legislative genesis from the process that produced the ACA.  Rather than 
enact S. 1790 on its own, Congress incorporated it by reference in a single 
paragraph of text in Section 10221 of the ACA.  S. 1790 itself contains over 260 
pages of legislative text amending and permanently reauthorizing the IHCIA.  S. 
1790 was added as Section 10221 to H.R. 3590 only two days before that bill 
which became the ACA was passed by the Senate.
8
  Section 10221 and other the 
Indian-specific health care provisions of the Act operate independently of the 
individual mandate provision declared unconstitutional by the district court.   
The reauthorization of and amendments to the IHCIA, along with other 
Indian provisions included in the ACA, provide critically important improvements 
to the delivery of health care to Indian people in the United States.  By failing to 
even examine whether provisions like Section 10221 and other Indian-specific 
provisions of the ACA could remain intact absent the individual mandate, the 
district court committed error. 
                                                 
8
 H.R. 3590 as passed by the Senate on December 24, 2009, was adopted by the 
House of Representatives on March 21, 2010, and signed into law by the President 
on March 23, 2010 as Pub. L. 111-148. 
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We begin with a discussion of the history of Congress’s treatment of Indian 
health care and the separate purposes and genesis of Section 10221 and other 
Indian-specific provisions in the ACA.  Then we show that consistent with 
governing severability rules the Indian-specific provisions of ACA are 
independent, freestanding laws that should remain even if this Court upholds the 
district court's determination that the individual mandate is unconstitutional.  
I. The history of Congress’s Indian health care legislation demonstrates 
that the IHCIA and other Indian-specific provisions of the ACA are 
entirely separate from the individual mandate provision of the ACA. 
A.  The reauthorization and amendment of the IHCIA. 
The IHCIA amendments enacted by Section 10221 of the ACA became part 
of H.R. 3590 – the Senate's health care reform legislation that eventually became 
law – only two days before that legislation was passed by the Senate.  On 
December 22, 2009, the Senate adopted a Manager's package of amendments, one 
of which was a new Part III to Title X titled ―Indian Health Care Improvement.‖9  
Part III consisted solely of Section 10221, a single page of legislation incorporating 
by reference amendments to the IHCIA that originated as a separate piece of 
legislation – S. 1790 – with the addition of four alterations to the text of that 
measure.   
                                                 
9
 S. Amdt. 3276: Roll Vote No. 387, 111
th 
Cong., 155 Cong. Rec. S13716 (daily 
ed. Dec. 22, 2009) and 155 Cong. Rec. S13504 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2009) [text of 
Amdt. 3276]. 
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S. 1790, titled the ―Indian Health Care Improvement Reauthorization and 
Extension Act of 2009‖, came out of a different committee than the remainder of 
the ACA, and has an entirely separate legislative history.  S. 1790 was introduced 
on October 15, 2009, by Senator Byron Dorgan and 15 co-sponsors and was 
referred to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, the panel with primary 
jurisdiction over Indian health.  By contrast, H.R. 3590 was the product of the 
Majority Leader's reconciliation of health care reform measures considered and 
approved by two other Senate committees – Finance and Health, Education, Labor 
and Pensions (HELP) – which have jurisdiction over all other health legislation.  
Amending the IHCIA was not a part of nor related to the efforts of those panels to 
craft health care reform bills. 
The legislative effort to reauthorize and amend the IHCIA had begun ten 
years earlier.  Stand-alone IHCIA reauthorization bills were introduced and 
considered in the 106
th
 Congress and each successive Congress until one 
eventually passed when incorporated by reference in the ACA.  
The IHCIA was initially enacted in 1976.  It reflects the Federal 
government's trust responsibility and legal obligation to provide health care 
services to Indian tribes and Indian people.  Articulated in treaties, judicial 
decisions, laws, regulations and policies over more than two centuries, the Federal 
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trust responsibility to Indians is robustly recognized by all branches of the Federal 
government.
10
   
In 1976, in response to the deplorable health status of Indian people, the 
shameful condition of the Indian hospitals and clinics, and inadequate or non-
existent sanitation facilities, the 94
th
 Congress enacted the IHCIA to bring order 
and direction to the unsatisfactory manner in which Indian health care was then 
delivered.
11
  After reciting a catalog of the conditions which imperil Indian health, 
the new law made a firm commitment to Indian people in its Declaration of Policy: 
―The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation, in 
fulfillment of its special responsibilities and legal obligation to the 
American Indian people, to meet the national goal of providing the 
highest possible health status to Indians and to provide existing Indian 
health services with all resources necessary to effect that policy.‖12   
The IHCIA has been reauthorized and amended a number of times since 
1976, with extensive substantive amendments enacted in 1992 to strengthen its 
programmatic provisions.  In 1999, a new effort to reauthorize and update the 
IHCIA began.  In that year and throughout the ensuing decade, IHCIA bills were 
                                                 
10
 See, e.g., President’s Memorandum on Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed. Reg. 57881 
(Nov. 9, 2009), and Executive Order 13175 on Consultation and Coordination with 
Tribes, as guided by the trust relationship, 65 Fed. Reg. 67249 (Nov. 6, 2000).  See 
also n. 8, supra.  
11
 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1026-Part I, at 1-17 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652-2657. 
12
 Indian Health Care Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 94-437, Sec. 3, reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat. 1401). 
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introduced in every Congress.  Some achieved congressional committee approval 
and one bill was debated on the Senate floor – the first time this occurred in more 
than 15 years.
13
  But the political and legislative stars did not align to achieve 
enactment.   
Meanwhile, there was a continuing health care crisis in Indian country.  As 
Senator Byron Dorgan observed when introducing the seventh IHCIA Senate bill 
in 2009, ―[w]e face a bona fide crisis in health care in our Native American 
communities, and this bill is a first step toward fulfilling our treaty obligations and 
trust responsibility to provide quality health care in Indian Country.‖14  Despite 
improvement in some health status measures over prior decades, Indian health 
disparities continued to read like those of third world countries.  Senator Dorgan 
cited to but a few of these:  ―Native Americans die of tuberculosis at a rate 600 
percent higher than the general population, suicide rates are nearly double, 
alcoholism rates are 510 percent higher, and diabetes rate are 189 percent higher 
than the general population.‖15   
Attacking these health status deficiencies requires a sufficient level of 
resources, something the Indian health system chronically lacks.  When Congress 
                                                 
13
 Indian Health Care Improvement Act Amendments of 2007, S. 1200: Roll Vote 
No. 32, 110
th
 Cong., 154 Cong. Rec. S1155 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2008). 
14
 155 Cong. Rec. S10493 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2009). 
15
 Id. 
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enacted the IHCIA in 1976, it reported that per capita expenditures for Indian 
health were then ―25 percent below per capita expenditures for health care in the 
average American community.‖16 
The problem of inadequate funding has not been cured in the ensuing 
decades.  The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported that for 2003, the IHS 
spending for Indian medical care was 62 percent lower than the U.S. per capita 
amount.
17
  It also reported that the per capita amount spent on IHS medical care 
($1,194) was only half the per capita amount spent on health care for Federal 
prisoners ($3,808), and at the bottom of the list of all federal health programs.
18
  
When introducing S. 1790 in the fall of 2009, Senator Dorgan observed that the 
health care system for Native Americans is ―only funded at about half of its 
need.‖19   
                                                 
16
 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1026-Part I, at 16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2655. 
17
 U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Broken Promises: Evaluating the Native 
American Health Care System, 98 (Sept. 2004), 
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/nahealth/nabroken.pdf. 
18
 Id.  The other federal programs in the comparison were:  Medicare ($5,915); 
Veterans Affairs users ($5,213); U.S. per capita ($5,065); Medicaid acute care 
($3,879); and the Federal Employees Health Benefit program benchmark ($3,725).  
Id. 
19
 155 Cong. Rec. S10493 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2009) (statement of Sen. Dorgan). 
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It is impossible to overstate the importance of the IHCIA revisions to the 
Indian health system.  The amendments enacted by the ACA made the IHCIA a 
permanent Federal law without expiration date; enhanced authorities to 
recruit/retain health care professionals to overcome high vacancy rates; expanded 
programs to address diseases such as diabetes that are at alarmingly high levels in 
Indian country; augmented the ability of tribal epidemiology centers to devise 
strategies to address local health needs; provided more equitable and innovative 
procedures for construction of health care and sanitation facilities; expanded 
opportunities for third party collections in order to maximize all revenue sources; 
established comprehensive behavioral health initiatives, with a particular focus on 
the Indian youth suicide crisis; and expressly authorized operation of modern 
methods of health care delivery such as long-term care and home- and community-
based care, staples of the mainstream health system but not previously authorized 
for the Indian health system.   
B. Other ACA provisions intended to benefit Indian health and Indian 
people are unrelated and do not depend on the individual mandate. 
The ACA contains several other beneficial Indian provisions that, like the 
IHCIA component, were put into the Senate's health care reform bill because it was 
a moving legislative vehicle, not because they were part of or related to the 
individual mandate component or integral pieces of the health care reform fabric.  
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The constitutionality of these Indian-specific provisions has not been challenged.  
Thus, like the IHCIA component, all should remain in full force and effect. 
A description of each provision follows. 
 Sec. 2901.  Special rules relating to the Indian health care program 
and Indians receiving services from that program.  Here Congress grouped into 
one section three unrelated subsections that benefit individual Indians or the Indian 
health system:  (a) a cross-reference to the cost-sharing exemption for Indians 
enrolled in a qualified health plan offered through a state Exchange; (b) 
codification of payer of last resort status for the components of the Indian health 
provider system; and (c) designation of the IHS, tribes and tribal organizations that 
operate health programs, and urban Indian organizations as "express lane agencies" 
which, at the election of the state in which the program is located, are authorized to 
make Medicaid and CHIP eligibility determinations to facilitate enrollment of 
eligible individuals in those programs.   
These provisions were included in the health care reform bill reported by the 
Finance Committee as all topics are under Finance Committee jurisdiction.
 20
  The 
provision was included in H.R. 3590 approved by the Senate. 
                                                 
20
 S. Rep. No. 111-89, at 105 (2009). 
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 Sec. 2091.  Elimination of sunset for reimbursement for all Medicare 
Part B services furnished by certain Indian hospitals and clinics.  This 
provision amends Sec. 1880 of the Social Security Act, the statutory provision 
which authorizes IHS and tribally-operated hospitals and clinics to receive 
reimbursements from Medicare.  The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, 
and Modernization Act of 2003 (Pub. L. 108-173) expanded the Medicare Part B 
services for which such reimbursements were authorized for the five-year period 
Jan. 1, 2005 through Dec. 31, 2009.  Sec. 2091 removed the ―sunset‖ date and 
authorized these entities to continue to collect reimbursements for all Medicare 
Part B services without interruption. 
This provision was included in the Finance Committee’s health care reform 
bill reported to the Senate
21
 and was retained in H.R. 3590 as approved by the 
Senate. 
 Sec. 3314.  Including costs incurred by AIDS drug assistance 
programs and Indian Health Service in providing prescription drugs toward 
the annual out-of-pocket threshold under Part D.  This provision corrects a 
problem encountered by IHS, tribal and urban Indian organization pharmacies that 
provide Medicare Part D prescription drugs to their Indian patients without cost.  
Since the value of such drugs was not counted as out-of-pocket costs of the patient, 
                                                 
21
 Id. at 260. 
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the patient was not able to qualify for the catastrophic coverage level under Part D.  
The Sec. 3314 amendment removed this barrier by directing that effective Jan. 1, 
2011, the cost of drugs borne or paid by an Indian pharmacy are to be considered 
out-of-pocket costs of the patient. 
This provision was added to the Finance Committee bill during mark-up,
22
 
and was retained in the reconciled bill, H.R. 3590, approved by the Senate. 
 Sec. 9021.  Exclusion of health benefits provided by Indian tribal 
governments.  This section amends the Internal Revenue Code to exclude from an 
individual tribal member's gross income the value of health benefits, care or 
coverage provided by the IHS or by an Indian tribe or tribal organization to its 
members.  The provision overrides the determination by the Internal Revenue 
Service that the value of health benefits purchased by an Indian tribe for its 
members constituted taxable income to the member – even when a tribe stepped in 
to provided such coverage to make up for insufficient funding from the IHS.   
This provision was added to the Finance Committee’s health care reform bill 
that was reported to the Senate
23
 and was retained in the reconciled bill, H.R. 3590, 
approved by the Senate. 
                                                 
22
 Id. at 260. 
23
 Id. at 356. 
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C. The Indian health care system is separate and distinct from the 
insurance-based system, and thus Section 10221 and the other Indian-
specific ACA provisions are separable from the individual mandate 
and should remain valid. 
None of the Indian-specific provisions described above is related to or 
dependent upon the efficacy or validity of the individual mandate.  In fact, 
members of Indian tribes are exempt from the individual mandate penalty, see 26 
U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(3), in recognition of the trust responsibility for Indian health 
and consistent with the Congressional practice of enacting Indian-specific health 
care laws.   
The Indian health care delivery system is unique; it is not like the 
mainstream health care system.  It was established by the Federal government to 
carry out a Federal responsibility to the indigenous people who, without the IHS 
system, would likely have inadequate access to health services.  IHS health care 
facilities are located in Indian communities.  IHS programs are tailored to address 
the needs of those communities.  IHS personnel are responsible for directly 
providing care — unless a tribe elects to take over operation of health programs, as 
many have done. 
Unlike the mainstream health delivery system for which the individual 
mandate and guaranteed-issue insurance reforms were created, the Indian health 
system is not insurance-based.  Rather, it is designed specifically to perform the 
trust responsibility, and the IHCIA directs how this Federal responsibility for 
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Indian health is to be carried out.  Services to Indian people are provided directly at 
IHS and tribal hospitals and clinics, supplemented by the purchase of contract 
health services.  While these Indian programs are authorized to collect 
reimbursements from Medicare, Medicaid and private insurance when they serve 
Indian patients with such coverage, enrollment in an insurance plan is not a pre-
requisite for receiving IHS care.  Eligibility for IHCIA-authorized programs is 
defined in federal regulations based on Indian status and is not dependent on 
obtaining health insurance. 
The district court did not review any Indian-specific ACA provisions, and 
therefore did not make the factual findings that would have distinguished them 
from the individual mandate reforms.  Proper application of the Supreme Court’s 
severability rules demonstrates that the Indian-specific provisions of the ACA are 
separable and remain valid even if the individual mandate is severed. 
II. Section 10221 of the ACA, reauthorizing and amending the IHCIA, and 
other Indian-specific provisions in the ACA, are all separable from the 
individual mandate provision held unconstitutional by the district court. 
A. Assuming the district court correctly ruled the individual mandate 
unconstitutional, proper application of the Supreme Court’s 
severability test would have resulted in a determination that the 
Indian-specific provisions of the ACA remained intact as valid law.    
Once a portion of a statute is found unconstitutional, the purpose of the 
court’s severability rule is to separate and save those other portions of the 
legislation that are practically and legally independent and therefore valid.   
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As the Supreme Court stated most recently:  
―Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, 
we try to limit the solution to the problem, severing any problematic 
portions while leaving the remainder intact.  Because the 
unconstitutionality of a part of an Act does not necessarily defeat or 
affect the validity of its remaining provisions, the normal rule is that 
partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the required course." 
Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S.Ct. at 3161 (emphasis added) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted); see also, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of 
N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (the court should ―strive to 
salvage‖ the remainder of the statute).   
Severing the problematic provision to leave ―the remainder intact‖ involves 
application of a two-part test.  First, upon finding a provision unconstitutional, the 
court must determine whether other provisions function independently and remain 
―fully operative as a law‖; if so, the invalid provision is ―presumed severable.‖  
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 934 (1983).  Second, the court must ―sustain‖ the 
remaining provisions unless it is ―evident‖ that Congress would have preferred the 
rest of the statute (or particular sections) to be invalidated along with the 
unconstitutional provision.  See Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S.Ct. at 3161-62 
(citations omitted).  Essentially, this means respecting Congress’s intent regarding 
the remaining provisions.  ―Unless it is evident that the legislature would not have 
enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is 
not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.‖  
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Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. at 191 (applying 
severability principles to executive order) (quoting Champlin Refining Co., 286 
U.S. at 234); see also, Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (court should 
refrain from invalidating more of statute than necessary).  
The Indian-specific provisions of the ACA function as stand-alone, ―fully 
operative‖ laws that implement a unique health care delivery system in Indian 
country.  This system is operated by the IHS or by tribes, such as many of the 
amici tribes, who take over health program operations through agreements with the 
IHS.  Nothing in the district court’s analysis of the individual mandate even hints 
at a finding that Congress intended or would have preferred that the provisions 
applicable only to the Indian health system be invalidated along with the individual 
mandate.  In fact, in its January 31, 2011 Order, the district court acknowledged 
that ―some (perhaps even most) of the remaining provisions [of ACA] can most 
likely function independently of the individual mandate.‖ Record Excerpts (―RE‖) 
2066.  This accurate observation make inexplicable the court's subsequent 
conclusion that ―there is nothing to indicate that [the remaining provisions] can 
[function] in the manner intended by Congress.‖  RE 2067. 
This conclusion is wrong on two counts.  First, it is contrary to the ―normal 
rule,‖ which requires that other sections remain operative unless there is evidence 
that Congress would not have enacted them independently.  Free Enterprise Fund, 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 04/08/2011     Page: 46 of 57
 23 
 
130 S.Ct. at 3161.  Second, this conclusion is factually wrong regarding the Indian-
specific provisions, which have no connection to and are not dependent upon the 
individual mandate, and thus can ―function in a manner consistent with the intent 
of Congress.‖  Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987) (emphasis in 
original).  Nothing in any of the ACA’s Indian-specific provisions, in either their 
text or historical context, provides any evidence that Congress would not have 
enacted them without the individual mandate.  Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S.Ct. at 
3161. 
B. By invalidating the ACA in its entirety, the district court improperly 
frustrated the will of Congress.    
After declaring the individual mandate unconstitutional, the district court 
was clearly daunted by the prospect of reviewing a statute 2,700 pages long with 
several hundred sections.  RE 2066.  However, the ―normal‖ rule of presumed 
validity requires that the court take some objective measure of the remaining 
provisions.  In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute the court ―should act 
cautiously‖ because ―[a] ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the 
elected representatives of the people.  Therefore, a court should refrain from 
invalidating more of the statute than is necessary.‖  Regan, 468 U.S. at 652.  
―[W]henever an act of Congress contains unobjectionable provisions separable 
from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of [the] court to so declare, 
and to maintain the act in so far as it is valid.‖  Id., at 652-53 (quoting El Paso & 
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Northeastern R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909)).  Whether an 
unconstitutional provision is severable ―is largely a question of legislative intent, 
but the presumption is in favor of severability.‖  Id. at 653.  Thus, a court should 
―strive to salvage‖ as much as possible of a statute, so that the court does not ―use 
its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.‖  Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 
330 (quoting Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 94 (1979)).  If careful analysis is 
required to determine that a particular provision of a statute is unconstitutional,
24
 it 
stands to reason that the remaining portions of the statute, presumed valid, should 
also be scrutinized carefully before determining if they are independent ―fully 
operative‖ provisions of law and therefore remain valid, or if they bear such close 
connection to the unconstitutional provision that they too must be invalidated.
25
   
                                                 
24
 ―[A]n Act of Congress ought not to be construed to violate the Constitution if 
any other possible construction remains available.‖  NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of 
Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500, 99 S.Ct. 1313 (1979). 
25
 In the five severability cases cited by the district court the Supreme Court, after 
careful analysis, opted for severing the unconstitutional provision and leaving the 
remainder intact.  See Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
130 S.Ct. 3138, 3161–62 (2010) (Sarbanes-Oxley Act); Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328–31 (2006) (New Hampshire 
Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act); New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 186–
87 (1992) (Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 
U.S. 678, 684–87 (1987) (Airline Deregulation Act); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
934–35 (1983) (Immigration and Nationality Act).  By contrast, in a recent case 
where the Court did strike the entire law, it did so after concluding that saving it 
would have required the Court to, among other things, ―write words into the 
statute.‖  Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006) (Vermont Campaign 
Finance Reform Act). 
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In this case the district court devoted sixty plus pages to the analysis of the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate, but only eleven pages to the 
determination that the Act was invalid in its entirety.  The court did not evaluate 
the history or genesis of the Indian-specific provisions in any way.  In fact the 
court specifically disclaimed any intent to review the entire Act, noting that it 
would ―take considerable time and extensive briefing‖ to go through ―the 2,700-
page Act line-by-line, invalidating dozens (or hundreds) of some sections while 
retaining dozens (or hundreds) of others.‖  RE 2073.  Without such analysis, 
however, the court was not able to ―limit the solution‖ to the perceived problem with 
the individual mandate.  See Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S.Ct. at 3161.  By 
invalidating the Indian-specific provisions along with the rest of the Act, the court 
nullified much more than was necessary to excise the effect of the individual 
mandate.  If this Court reaches the severance issue and applies the severability rule 
consistent with Supreme Court doctrine, the validity of the Indian provisions will 
be apparent and should be upheld.   
C. The court erred by concluding that the entire ACA is connected to the 
individual mandate rather than viewing the ACA as a collection of 
diverse laws. 
The ACA is a package of many diverse provisions.  As even the district 
court recognized, some of the provisions in the ACA ―have only a remote and 
tangential connection to health care.‖  RE 2066.  The district court in Virginia v. 
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Sebelius noted that the final version of the 2,700 page bill encompassed ―a wide 
variety of topics related and unrelated to health care.‖ 728 F.Supp.2d at 789.  Even 
a casual reading of the ACA demonstrates that Congress did not seek to achieve 
only one purpose in this massive law.  Nonetheless, the district court concluded 
that the individual mandate ―was, in fact, the keystone or lynchpin of the entire 
health reform effort.‖  RE 2068.  The court inaccurately characterized the entire 
ACA as ―a carefully-balanced and clockwork-like statutory arrangement 
comprised of pieces that all work toward one primary legislative goal,‖ and on that 
basis reached the unsupportable conclusion that, having found one provision 
unconstitutional, ―severability is not appropriate.‖  RE 2066.  There is debate about 
how interconnected the individual mandate is with some provisions in the ACA.
26
  
But there can be no argument about the fact that the individual mandate bears no 
relation at all to the Indian-specific provisions of the ACA. 
                                                 
26
 The United States argues that the individual mandate stands or falls with the 
Act’s guaranteed-issue and community-rating insurance industry reforms, but no 
more.  See Brief for Appellants at 59.  The district court in Virginia v. Sebelius, 
severed only the individual mandate (Section 1501) and ―directly-dependent 
provisions which make specific reference to Section 1501.‖  728 F.Supp.2d at 789.  
The court in Virginia v. Sebelius was more circumspect in recognizing that the Act 
encompassed ―a wide variety of topics related and unrelated to health care,‖ and 
that it would require ―extensive expert testimony and significant supplementation 
of the record‖ for the Court to ―determine what, if any, portion of the bill would 
not be able to survive independently.‖  Id. at 786 (emphasis added).  
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To conclude, as the district court did, that the individual mandate is 
―essential‖ to the entire ACA paints the ACA with one very broad brush, when a 
closer reading shows varied brushstrokes and at least one set of discrete canvases – 
the Indian-specific provisions that are ―fully operative‖ as independent laws.  The 
district court recognized that when ―Congress intended a given statute to be viewed 
as a bundle of separate legislative enactment or a series of short laws, which for 
purposes of convenience and efficiency were arranged together in a single 
legislative scheme, it is presumed that any provision declared unconstitutional can 
be struck and severed without affecting the remainder of the statute.‖  RE 2065-66.  
The district court inexplicably failed to recognize that the ACA is just such an act – 
a ―bundle‖ of separate laws, including the Indian-specific provisions.  In so doing, 
the district court improperly invalidated the entire Act contrary to the Supreme 
Court’s severability rules. 
D. The court erred by according too much significance to the lack of a 
severability clause in the statute. 
The district court accorded too much significance to the fact that the ACA 
does not contain a ―severability clause,‖ and that although one had been included 
in an earlier version of the legislation, none appears in the bill that finally became 
law.  RE 2068-69.  However, the absence of such a clause, in and of itself, ―does 
not raise a presumption against severability.‖  Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686.  In 
fact, the presence of a severability clause merely creates the presumption of 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 04/08/2011     Page: 51 of 57
 28 
 
severability.  It is still necessary to engage in the severability inquiry, even where 
such a clause is included in the statute.  See id. (where a severability clause is 
included in the statute, only ―strong evidence‖ can overcome it). 27 
Thus, the presence or absence of a severability clause may inform review, 
but it is still necessary to analyze whether Congress would have enacted each 
provision of the statute in any event.
28
  The district court reached too far in 
concluding that Congress's failure to include a severability clause in the ACA ―can 
be viewed as strong evidence that Congress recognized the Act could not operate 
as intended without the individual mandate.‖  RE 2069 (emphasis in original).  
That conclusion misses the mark because once again it incorrectly assumes that the 
individual mandate applies to all aspects of the ACA.  In weighing the absence of a 
severability clause, the court failed to give any consideration to the terms and 
genesis of Section 10221 and other Indian-specific provisions because of its 
                                                 
27
 The district court supports its view by quoting Russello v. United States, 464 
U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983) (―Where Congress includes [particular] language in an 
earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that 
the [omitted provision] was not intended.‖)  However, Russello is not relevant.  
It involved a rule of interpretation that the substantive meaning of a 
provision alters when limiting language in the text of the provision is struck 
from a later version, and thus has no relevance to the presence or absence of 
a severability clause, which is governed by the rules discussed above.  
28
 Notably, Senate and House drafting manuals provide that a severability clause is 
unnecessary unless Congress intends to make portions of a statute unseverable.  
See Interpreting by the Book: Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory 
Interpretation, 120 Yale L.J. 185, 190 (2010). 
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intense focus on the individual mandate provision.  The Indian-specific provisions 
are clearly separable and should not be invalidated. 
CONCLUSION 
If this Court affirms the district court's ruling that the individual mandate is 
unconstitutional, the district court’s invalidation of the ACA in its entirety should 
nonetheless be reversed, at least with respect to the Indian-specific provisions, 
which are separable and should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of April, 2011. 
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